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The Development Agreement:
An Essential Legal Tool For Securing Direct Investments In
The Developing World Against Non-Commercial Risks
The call for a "New Economic World Order"' and the widening
economic gap between the developing and the developed countries 2
have brought pressure upon both foreign direct investors and receiv-
ing countries to reevaluate their traditional modes of operation. 3 While
international organizations and national aid programs provide a sup-
ply of investment capital, development experts and public officials
alike recognize the potential benefits to be derived from private
investments. 4 Recognizing that direct foreign investment if properly
applied can benefit both the investor and the host country, legal
analysts have been pressed to overcome the barriers to such invest-
ment created by non-commercial risks.
As an element of the legal regime available to both investors and
host countries, the development agreement provides a means to
stimulate the flow of private capital necessary to further economic
development in the Third World. As such, the development agree-
ment, 5 the product of direct negotiations between the foreign investor
and the host country, should be given more consideration as a means
to stimulate foreign direct investment since it offers both a format upon
which the parties can negotiate mutually advantageous terms, and a
contract which enhances the legal status and stability of foreign
investment transactions.
While this comment addresses the benefits of the development
agreement from the perspective of an American investor, the analysis
1 THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, REPORT OF THE SECOND
COMMITTEE, U.N. Doc. A/9946 at 28; Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 275 (1975);
White, New International Economic Order, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 542 (1975).
2 G.A. Res. 2626, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/8028 at Preamble
(1970); UNCTAD, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS
155, table 5.5 (1969).
3 See generally Kahn, The Standard Investment Agreement: Text and Comments, 4 GA. J.
OF INT'L & CoMP. L. 39 (1974).
4 Seegenerally THE PROMOTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF PRIVATE CAPITAL, U.N.
Doc. E/3325, Feb. 26, 1960, U.N. Doc. E/3492, May 18, 1961; see also Advisory
Committee on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid, U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Report on
Foreign Aid through Private Initiative (1965).
5 Commentators have used several terms to refer to contracts between a state and
a foreign investor. See generally G. CHESHIRE, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (1948); A.
FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS (1962); Carlston, Interna-
tional Rule of Concession Agreements, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 618 (1957); Jennings, State
Contracts in International Law, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 156 (1961); Lalive, Contracts between a
State or a State Agency and a Foreign Company, 13 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 987 (1964);
Olmstead, Economic Development Agreements Part II - Agreements between States and
Aliens; Choice of Law and Remedy, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 504 (1961); Verdross, Quasi-
International Agreements and International Economic Transactions, 18 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 230
(1964).
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which follows argues equally for the adoption of these agreements by
developing countries as a tactic to stimulate beneficial long term
private foreign investments. This comment will focus on the manner in
which the development agreement may reduce the risks and uncer-
tainties associated with investments sensitive to changes in host
government policies. It is intended to aid the lawyer representing the
investor in two ways: first, to identify and evaluate the risks confront-
ing an investment proposal, and secondly, to establish the most secure
legal position consistent with the investor's objectives. 6 Commentators
differ as to the adequacy of the various measures designed to protect
and stimulate desired foreign investment; but most agree that the legal
security of international transactions is problematic and unsettled.
Some argue that while many of the gaps in the protective legal
framework have been filled, many other important ones remain. 7 As a
negotiating and legal tool the development agreement is a practical,
and possibly essential, device for bridging these gaps in the initiation
and securing of foreign direct investments.
Present Trends in The Investment Climate: The Quest for Mutual Advantage
The people of the developing world continue to demand an
improved standard of living. From political necessity, national leaders
have responded to these demands and have turned to governmental
regulation and control of the economy as a means of bringing together
sufficient capital resources to ward off, through economic develop-
ment, the "grinding heel" of poverty. 8 Those who would modernize
are hindered from achieving these economic and'social development
goals by the shortage of capital resources, modern equipment, and
technological and managerial skills. 9 To resolve the problem these
limitations present, private, national and international bodies have
given great attention to the role that private foreign capital can play in
assisting developing countries to improve their standard of living. 10
They understand the basic problem: that the developing world needs
considerable amounts of capital-capital which must flow from foreign
sources for an indefinite period. 1
A pervasive assumption of the late 1950's, deriving from the
limited supply of investment capital, placed the burden on the capital-
6 Pugh, Legal Protection of International Transactions Against Non-Commercial Risks,
in JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 301 (W. Surrey & C. Show eds. 1963) [Hereinafter cited
as Pugh].
Id. at 357; see generally Fatouros, Legal Security for International Investment, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 699 (W. Friedmann & R. Pugh eds. 1959).
8 Harvey, The Challenge of the Rule of Law, 59 MICH. L. REV. 603, 612 (1961).
9 See Landau, Direct Foreign Investments in Developing Countries, 4 J.L. & ECON. DEv.
182 (1969).
10 J. HENDERSON, FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS AND AGRICULTURE 1 (1970).
11 See generally G. MYRDALL, THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POVERTY, A WORLD ANTI-
POVERTY PROGRAM IN OUTLINE (1970).
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importing nation to construct an environment for investment that
favored the foreign investor at the expense of domestic goals. National
leaders were willing to make concessions to investors in order to attract
their capital. 12 Accepting the view that developing nations were not in
a position to command the terms of foreign investment, the General
Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution encouraging these
nations to "re-examine, wherever necessary, domestic policies, legisla-
tion and administrative practices with a view to improving the invest-
ment climate. '13
While the condition of limited capital has not been significantly
altered, the burden of compromise necessary to provide the environ-
ment for investment must, however, now be shared by the investor.
The political independence of former colonies and the concomitant rise
of nationalism have altered the financial market positions of investor
and host country. While the developing countries need a considerable
amount of capital to insure the survival and progress of their peoples,
they are now more likely to demand that investments contribute to
their economic development. They will thus judge the investment
proposals of foreign capitalists in the light of their own national
development plans in order to further economic growth and maintain
national sovereignty.
The initial expression of the developing nations' right to self-
determination was set forth in 1962 in the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources. The General Assembly recognized that foreign
capital should be used to advance the freely determined goals of the
developing nations 14 but also emphasized that traditional concepts of
international law were still in force: "[i]n cases where authorization is
granted, the capital imported and the earnings on that capital shall be
governed by the terms thereof, by the national legislation in force, and
by international law." 15
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States passed by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1974 goes beyond the statements
of the 1962 Resolution. The Charter recognizes the state's right:
[tlo nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign prop-
erty, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by
the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant
laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers
pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives
rise to controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the
nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and
12 See, e.g., President's Speech on Foreign Capital and Ghana's Economic Policy, GHANA
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (Oct. 1960).
13 G.A. Res. 824, 5 U.N. GAOR 128 (1954).
14 G.A. Res. 1803, § 2, 9 U.N. GAOR 107 (1962).
'S Id. § 3.
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mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means
be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States .... 16
Commentators argue that the provisions of the 1974 Charter depart
from the traditional sanctity of contract as governed by principles of
international law. While the United States and other developed coun-
tries have rejected the argument that the Charter is legally binding, 17 it
has been argued that the new consensus which is supported by 104
states accepts a new international legal standard which rejects the
requirement of just compensation as a precondition to the legality of
any expropriation. 18 The uncertainty surrounding this debate over the
applicability of traditional notions of international law has contributed
to a worsening of the climate for direct private investments. As a
result, investors have been giving greater weight to non-commercial
risks in their decisions whether to commit private capital in the Third
World.
The Importance of Non-Commercial Risks on Foreign Investment
International business transactions in the developing world are of
course subject to significant degrees of non-commercial risks. These
risks vary from country to country according to the degree of political,
economic and social change threatening the status quo. Because of
these risks, direct investment in developing countries is subject to a set
of problems largely different from those experienced in the indus-
trialized world.
In his study, Yair Aharoni1 9 fond that American investors rely
upon foreign government concessions to neutralize obstacles to the
implementation of a project. He identified those concessions which
reduced the impact of risk and uncertainty as being the most impor-
tant.
A nation's framework of economic legislation is a controlling and
essential factor in the creation of a stable investment climate which will
attract desirable foreign investment. 20 In constructing the framework,
the capital-importing nation must weigh the fears of the investor that
changes in government policy will cause low returns and an inability to
remit capital and profits against its own fears of foreign domination
and exploitation. The key to a successful resolution of this conflict is
16 THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, REPORT OF THE SECOND
COMMITTEE, U.N. Doc. A/9946.
17 White, supra note 1, at 546.
18 Id. at 547.
19 y. AHARONI, THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESS 171 (1966).
20 FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 28 U.N. Doc. E/446 (1968); see also
Gess, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 398 (1964);
Schwebel, Story of the U.N.'s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Re-
sources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463 (1963).
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not only the accommodation of essential terms but also the creation of
an investment climate characterized by certainty and stability.
The present climate is not one of certainty and stability. "Today,
there is no longer any general agreement on the degree of protection to
be accorded to private property and the rights connected with it."
21
Thus the overwhelmingly important issues of expropriation and com-
pensation remain without general solution. 22 The fear of outright
taking is, however, only one of many issues affecting foreign invest-
ments. Short of being expropriated, the investor may be subjected to
regulations which do not in themselves constitute expropriation but
whose effect may be to render an enterprise unprofitable.
[Property] can be taken indirectly by exchange controls, export
and import regulations, taxation, labor regulations, limitations on
the ownership and control of enterprises, price controls, even by
run-away inflation. Indeed, the prospect of these indirect takings
provides much more of a deterrent to private foreign investment in
under-developed countries than the prospect of a direct taking via
confiscation or expropriation. 23
Referred to as "creeping expropriation," 24 these conditions impair the
existence of a conducive investment climate in the developing nations.
The Role of the Development Agreement
Contracts governing the investment of foreign nations in develop-
ing countries have been given many different labels depending upon
the nature of the parties and the interests incorporated into the
document. 25 For the purposes of this discussion, the term development
agreement is adopted in recognition of the influence that economic
development plans and policies exert upon the terms contained in the
contract. In the final analysis the duration of profitable business
activity will depend upon the degree to which the investment com-
plements the economic development goals of the host country.
In the past, investors have attempted to minimize the effects of
political risks where possible by structuring investment projects to
maximize short-term profits. This investment strategy begs for gov-
ernment reprisals, contributes to an unstable business environment,
and discourages the selection of projects most compatible with de-
velopment goals. The development agreements can reduce political
risk by creating an investment framework which governs the long-
term business relationship between the foreign investor and the
receiving country. By allowing for contribution to development goals,
21 FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 20, at 28.
22 A. FATOUROS, supra note 5, at 249.
23 W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 865-66 (3d ed. 1971).
24 Id. at 865, citing 53 PROC. AM. SOCY INT'L L. 255, 262 (1959).
25 For a general introduction to development agreements see note 5, supra.
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the agreement creates a measure of economic protection for the
investor. By allowing the host country to offer the best investment
terms' possible in light of the particular nature of a proposal, the
arrangement enhances a nation's attractiveness to desired investors.
The development agreement can thus be highly responsive to the
unique nature of each investment proposal and can be used to
supplement broad policy statements and statutes governing the treat-
ment of foreign investments.
Beyond its administrative advantages, the development agree-
ment may have a legal effect contributing to investment security. While
the law of development agreements is newly forming, the investor and
the host country may look to this document as a means of giving legal
force to specific terms essential to a viable investment climate. Within
the context of national and international legal treatment of foreign
investment today, the development agreement can thus contribute to
the reduction of political risks which deter essential foreign invest-
ments in the developing world.
Investment Procedures Of Host Countries
To obtain the means necessary to achieve a higher standard of
living, developing countries adopt development plans, policy state-
ments, laws and regulations in order to attract, direct and control
foreign investment. 26 In the aggregate these governmental directives
create a set of rules which govern foreign investment and contribute
substantially to the creation of the investment climate. 27 In a large
number of developing countries special investment codes have been
adopted to attract private foreign capital. 28 These codes provide a
comprehensive legal framework within which the foreign investor
must function if he is to invest in the country or qualify for the
incentives provided by the legislation. 29
In many countries, the prospective investor is required by law to
negotiate with an investment board or committee which is the adminis-
trative and regulatory arm of the government. While their functions
vary, the investment boards perform any combination of the following
tasks: (1) receive and process investment applications; (2) circulate
applications with recommendations to appropriate ministries; (3) in-
26 Increased foreign investment, if properly structured, can help a developing
nation to: introduce new technology; increase domestic production; stimulate import
substitution; earn foreign exchange by expanding the export sector; create increased
employment and higher income levels; provide opportunities for skilled labor and
management development; and contribute to the basic infrastructure of the economy.
See Landau, supra note 9.
27 J. HENDERSON, supra note 10, at 7. The reader is cautioned to note that the
citations in the notes following to the domestic laws of various developing nations are
intended to serve as examples of the kinds of approaches which have been taken, and
not as assertions of the present state of the law in those countries.
28 See generally J. HENDERSON, supra note 10, at 179-98.
29 Id.
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itiate investment proposals; (4) provide investment data to the pros-
pective investor; (5) assist the investor in shaping the investment
proposal to correspond with national development objectives; (6)
represent the investor in obtaining special investment incentives; and
(7) grant approval of foreign investments and related special benefits
as provided by the appropriate legislation. 30
Qualification for investment incentives normally depends upon
the satisfaction of application procedures established by statute or the
investment board. While the procedures are not required in all coun-
tries, the investor must be aware that formal requirements may exist as
an absolute condition to the enjoyment of preferential treatment. For
example, the Indonesian Foreign Capital Investment Law 3 1 provides
the only avenue by which foreign investors may initiate activity and
qualify for established incentives. In Chile, on the other hand, the
investor has three alternatives, one of which requires no formalities
and offers no special benefits. 32
Approval of the application will take various forms, again depend-
ing upon the requirements established by the governing legislation.
The simplest procedural pattern will include the following steps: the
investment board will accept the application, review the document
internally, circulate for desired comments, and accept or reject the
proposal on the basis of the gathered information. As an illustration,
Afghanistan's Investment Committee issues a preliminary acknow-
ledgment to the applicant within three months of the initiation of the
application process. This acknowledgment states whether the prop-
osed investment is within the scope of the investment law, recom-
mends any changes the Committee wishes to propose, and asks for
additional information if necessary. The Committee gives final ap-
proval in writing as soon as possible but not within a specified time
limit. 33
Other approval procedures are more complex. The government of
Kenya, for example, requires the issuance of certificates of approval. 34
Another approach requires the investor to enter into a formal contract
with a government authority which specifies the regulations and
benefits applicable to the particular investment. 35 An investor may also
30 See Capital Investment Act, 1963, Section 2 (as amended) (Ghana); Decree-Law
No. 07366 of 20 October 1965, The Investment Law, art. 24 (Bolivia); Royal Decree No.
420-67 of December, 1967 (Morocco).
31 Law No. 1, The Foreign Capital Investment Law, Jan. 10, 1967 (Indonesia); see
INVESTMENT IN INDONESIA TODAY, GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (2d ed. 1968).
32 Decree No. 1272, Sept. 7, 1961, The Export, Import and Foreign Exchange
Decree (Chile).
33 Foreign and Domestic Private Investment Law, art. 22 (Afganistan).
34 Rules of Procedure for Granting a "Certificate of Approved Enterprise", pub'd
with The Foreign Investment Protection Act, 1964 (Kenya).
35 Promotion of Industrial Investment Act BE 2505 (1962) as amended Section 16,
1965 (Thailand).
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 159
berequired, in the alternative, to obtain some form of official approval
from a ministry36 or a decree from the chief executive of the country. 3 7
Where the proposals concern unique types of investment initiatives,
countries such as Afghanistan 38 and Saudi Arabia 39 have adopted
legislation providing for individual agreements.
Investment proposals will raise a broad range of issues as the
following list illustrates:
a. Nature and scope of tax liability;
b. Repatriation of capital and profits;
c. Protection from foreign competition by import control and tariff
protection;
d. Scope of property rights;
e. Employment and staffing;
f. Penalties and the settlement of disputes. 40
The application, negotiation, and approval process is a critical
period in establishing the best investment climate for attracting private
capital which will further development objectives. Depending on the
exact procedures available, the nature of the investment, and the
development needs of the country, the parties to the proposal will
demand certain conditions relating to the issues listed above. The
degree to which the broad language of regulatory statutes and policies
may be particularized to meet such demands in the context of a specific
project plays an integral role in determining the actual investment
climate of a country.
The Legal Status Of Development Agreements
The development agreement provides a legal formula which
permits the establishment of a normal regime which fixes the status and
rights of a desired investment and resulting business enterprise in
circumstances short of nationalization. 4 1 Many foreign investors enter
into commitments with little more than a vague understanding of their
legal positions in the event of expropriation. The development agree-
ment provides a vehicle to deal with this and the more frequent
problems of "creeping expropriation. ' 42 This tailored approach pro-
vides the means whereby the investor may acquire the additional
guarantees and understanding of specific matters necessary to estab-
lish the adequate investment security. By utilizing development
36 See Capital Investment Act, 1963, § 2(1)(b) (Ghana); Policy Statement on
Investment in Agriculture by the Indonesian Minister of Agriculture, Djakarta, Feb.
10, 1960.
37 J. HENDERSON, supra note 10, at 65.
38 Foreign and Domestic Private Investment Law, art. 26, Feb. 22, 1966 (Afganis-
ta n ).-3 9 Foreign Capital Investment Code, art. 10(b), 1964 (Saudi Arabia).
40 J. HENDERSON, supra note 10, table of contents.
41 Kahn, supra note 3, at 41.
42 See text accompanying notes 23 and 24, supra.
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agreements the host country may improve its investment attractive-
ness without compromising the essential policies of its development
program.
Ghana is a good example of a country in which a foreign investor
has been able to commit financial resources under the terms of an
investment agreement. According to the provisions of the old Capital
Investment Act, the Capital Investment Board administered the in-
vestment proposal and insured that the investment will satisfy the
requirements of the Act. Final approval is formalized by an agreement
between the responsible minister and the applicant which sets out the
benefits and conditions governing the enterprise. 43
The use of development agreements between a capital-importing
country and a foreign national has been well documented. 44 While the
scope of the contracts may vary, theoretically the state may enter into a
private agreement to eliminate entirely all non-commercial investment
risks arising from the exercise of its unrestrained sovereignty. In effect
the agreement grants the foreign national a range of commercial rights
which may exempt his investment from the municipal law and normal
governmental controls in exchange for the payment of prescribed
royalties and taxes, the investment of capital, or the provision of
technical, managerial, and marketing assistance. However, as applied,
the primary focus of most incentive programs for the attraction of
foreign capital has been on expropriation, taxation and exchange
restrictions. Investment incentives have failed to define in detail what
governmental actions would actually constitute a taking of property.
As a result government assurances "are likely to be of limited protec-
tion against creeping impairments of property rights that fall short of
an outright and permanent taking. ' '4S
The character of the contracting parties gives development agree-
ments a quasi-international nature. Not falling clearly within the scope
of either international agreements or private contracts, these agree-
ments may draw upon both public and private law. Schwarzenberger
classifies them as quasi-international, because they are concluded
between a state and a foreign national inter pares.46 "[T]hese agree-
ments form a third group of agreements, characterized by the fact that the
private rights established by them are governed by a new legal order,
created by the concurring wills of the parties, i.e., the agreed lex
43 Note that final approval does not take the form of administrative action. Capital
Investment Act, 1963, Section 2 (Ghana).
44 See generally INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW CENTER, SELECTED READINGS
ON PROTECTION BY LAW OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS (1964).
4- See Pugh, supra note 6, at 306-08.
46 Verdross, The Status of Foreign Private Investment Interests Stemming from
Economic Development Agreements with Arbitration Clauses, in SELECTED READINGS, supra
note 44, at 117-21.
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contractus.' '4 7 Thus, the instrument takes the form of autonomous
"canon" law governing the actions of both parties. 48
A comparison of the development agreement with normal ad-
ministrative contracts further illustrates the distinct nature of agree-
ments between a state and a foreign national. While both may create
rights in personam and in rem, they differ as to the nature of the law
governing their respective provisions. The administrative contract is
subject to the municipal law of the contracting state. The quasi-
international agreement is subject to the principle pacta sunt servanda
and other general principles of law which the parties may recognize as
binding.4 9 To enter into an administrative contract is to subject the
parties to contract interpretation and application according to the legal
order of the contracting state. In contrast, the lex contractus, created by
the development agreement, exists as an independent legal order
totally regulating the relationship between the parties. In controlling
the mutual rights and duties of the parties, the parties may adopt, for
the purpose of interpretation or general application, the laws of the
forum of their choice, including international law. By its nature the
administrative contract is necessarily subject to municipal law, while
the lex contractus character of the economic development agreement
provides for mutual selection of the law governing its terms.5 0
Commentators suggest that the body of the development agree-
ment, because of its nature and comprehensive character, should
provide the fundamental source of the law governing the contract.5 1
Other writers have taken a more extreme view asserting that the lex
contractus, created as it is by a quasi-international agreement, defines
the nature of the agreement and provides the source of the obligation
irrespective of other legal orders.5 2 Laline, citing the Saudi Arabia-
Aramco arbitration award, rejected this extreme view as artificial and
47 Id.
48 Fatouros and Cattan join other writers who argue that development agreements
combine elements of private and public law that cannot constitute either public
international law or municipal law, and that therefore such agreements are sui
generis. See Z. KRONFOL, PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 70 (1972).
49 Verdross, Protection of Private Property under Quasi-International Agreements, in
VARIA JURIS GENTIUM, (Liber Amicorum to J.P.A. Francois) 355-56, 358 (1959); A.
FATOUROS, supra note 5, at 262-71, 285-301. "A state cannot unilaterally abrogate its
treaties with other states without violating international law, and there is no real
difference in this respect between a treaty and a concession, except that the latter is an
agreement, not between two states, but between a state and a person of private law."
O'Connell, Legal Issues in the Persian Oil Dispute, 28 N.Z.L.J. 57, 58 (1952); see also
Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 775, 786 (1959).
so Verdross, supra note 46, at 125-27.
51 Carlston, International Rule of Concession Agreements, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 20 (1957).
The complex and mixed nature of these contracts has been emphasized in several
leading articles. See McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized
Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1957); Carlston, Concession Agreements and Nationaliza-
tion, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 260 (1958).
-2 Verdross, supra note 5.
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of limited utility. "A contract must be inserted in a pre-existing legal
order and cannot remain in a vacuum. This order should be clearly
defined or at least ascertainable by way of legal or judicial interpreta-
tion."5 3 While there presently is no consensus as to whether a
development agreement could be governed solely by its own terms,
strong authority suggests that the terms provided and any choice of
law specified should control. 54
Given an allegation of breach of contract, the terms of the
development agreement will greatly influence the means and manner
of settlement. Initially the development agreement may be viewed as a
means to define more narrowly the regulations governing the instru-
ment. This tailored approach presents the opportunity to specify the
rights and obligations of both parties and thereby allay the fears of
potential investors as to injury arising from unilateral government
actions. Through this detailed expression of the parties' intentions and
the quasi-international nature of the contract, the development agree-
ment provides the primary information by which to determine the
existence of a breach. 55 In addition, the agreement provides a means of
insuring that the hearing of any dispute can take place in a forum other
than the host country's municipal courts, so that strict municipal law
does not control.56 The advantages of these two factors will be stressed
in the materials that follow.
The choice of law question, for example, greatly influences the
resulting effect of any dispute upon the contract, i.e., whether the
investor will experience performance or non-performance of essential
terms. That choice will determine whether the injured party has a right
to cancel the contract, to alter its terms, or to obtain reparation, and, if
so, under what terms. 57 Should the investment be initiated under the
terms of a development agreement, the arbitral tribunal must ascertain
the law according to the intent of the parties as expressed by the lex
contractus. The actual interpretation depends on the nature of the
dispute and the presumed will of the parties in concluding an agree-
ment inter pares. 5
8
Development Agreement: A Legal Device Able to Improve the Investment
Climate
The direct-foreign investor may obtain a measure of protection for
his investment from a variety of sources. The municipal law of one or
more states, bilateral treaties, international conventions, customary
international law, and the quasi-international special investment ag-
53 Lalive, supra note 5, at 998.
54 See generally note 51, supra.
55 Id.
56 See text accompanying note 72, infra.
57 Lalive, supra note 5, at 992.
58 Verdross, supra note 46, at 130.
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reement all afford some security. The capital-importing country usu-
ally offers legal guarantees enforceable by municipal law. The United
States government offers insurance against non-commercial risk as an
incentive for the United States investor to invest in developing
countries. The United States also enters into Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation (FCN) treaties for the purpose of protecting foreign
investment of its nationals. The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD) Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States59 is a multilat-
eral instrument affecting the rights of investor and host country. The
investor may also partially rely upon the general principles of custom-
ary international law as we will see below. The final type of legal
regime available, the development agreement, has the potential to
complement the legal principles and devices mentioned above, and to
enhance the legal position of the American foreign investor. This is so
because each of the alternative protective devices has some vulnerable
point at which protection breaks down.
The following discussion will illustrate the proper role of the
development agreement in shoring up those weak points and provid-
ing the most advantageous investment climate possible in a given
situation. It is instructive to illustrate the weak points of these various
devices in the context of exchange controls, which are a major facet of
the problem of creeping expropriation.
A. Exchange Controls and the Problem of Investment Security
The guarantee of the right to remove profits and capital from the
host country is a condition essential to the investor's decision to initiate
a project. Without adequate assurance of favorable transfer terms,
forecasts of the necessary level of profits alone will be unable to attract
those investors needed to stimulate economic development. 60 Ex-
change controls are of importance not only because they may operate
to preclude the investor from obtaining in the host country the dollars
necessary for the remittance of current earnings or royalties or the
reparation of capital, but also because they may restrict the flow of
currency necessary for acquisition of important material and equip-
ment needed for the enterprise and for the payment of employee
salaries.
Exchange controls are a necessary element of a developing coun-
try's economic program. Because of the shortage of particular curren-
cies exchange controls may be imposed to assure that foreign exchange
is available for purposes seen as essential by the host government. 61
Therefore exchange regulations are in force in most developing coun-
59 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (1965).
60 Pugh, supra note 6, at 200-206.
61 J. HENDERSON, supra note 10, at 92.
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tries, but the nature of the regulations usually varies in accordance with
the country's balance of payments history. Tanzania allows for remit-
tance of profits, principal, and interest only in approved currencies. 62
Nigeria conditions the privilege of transfer upon prior approval by the
Federal Ministry of Finance. 63 The Algerian government only allows
the free transfer of up to fifty per cent of both capital and profits per
year. 64 Even for favored projects, the Somali Democratic Republic
limits the free transfer of profits, income and revenue accruing from
fixed assets on loan investments and the dividends and interest on
shares 'and bonds to an amount not to exceed fifteen per cent of the
capital invested. 65 Tunisia requires certain enterprises to remit less
than eight per cent. 66 In some countries, such as the Libyan Arab
Republic, the exchange controls applicable to a given enterprise are
determined by individual decisions on the merits. 67 In Senegal an
investment may enjoy more favorable exchange regulations if it is in
accordance with the national economic development plan. 68
B. 'Security Based Solely Upon National Laws and Policies
Protection against non-commercial risks are the lowest in cir-
cumstances where the foreign national makes an investment secured
only by the laws and policy statements of the host state. The investor
normally faces a situation where the state provides a special incentive
program offering a qualified applicant a range of benefits including
favorable terms for the transfer of capital and profits. The foreign
national need not enter into a contract to acquire these benefits, since
they are made available by right under statute, policy statement, or
administrative authority. However, the rights of the investor are
subject to changes arising from a shift in the policy of the host state.
Given the many shortcomings of this type of investment foundation,
foreign investors are well advised to obtain a separate agreement with
the state as a supplement to the investment laws presently in force. 6 9
To some extent the legal and constitutional system of a developing
country may provide the foreign-direct investor some guarantees
against public infringement of property and contract rights. For exam-
ple, the country may have adopted statutory or constitutional provi-
sions barring expropriation except for a public purpose subject to
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 70 However,
62 Act for Piotection of Approved Foreign Investments, Sept. 20, 1963 (Tanzania).
63 See INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA (1958).
64 Investment Code of 26 July 1963, Law No. 63-277 (Algeria).
65 Law on Foreign Investments, Feb. 13, 1960 (Somali Dem. Rep.).
66 Investment Decree, June 4, 1967 (Tunisia).
67 LAW OF DEVELOPING NATIONAL INDUSTRIES, Sept. 23, 1956, Law No. 51; Foreign
Capital Investment Act, Jan. 30, 1958 (Libyan Arab Rep.).
68 Investment Code of March 22, 1962, Law No. 61-33 (Senegal).
69 Pugh, supra note 6, at 327.
70 See U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 97/5/Rev.1 (1960).
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 165
the unique nature of non-commercial risks, to which a foreign invest-
ment is most sensitive, renders the legal protections and guarantees
mentioned above virtually without practical utility. 71
The investor's preventive planning and evaluation cannot afford
protection if the municipal courts refuse to grant the protection
apparently offered on the face of local law. For many reasons the
investor may have serious difficulties having rights recognized before
local tribunals or agencies. The problems may arise from procedural
barriers, from misunderstanding of the municipal law's substantive
provisions, or even from the inherent biases of the forum court in favor
of the state. 72
The most substantial risk is a state's authority unilaterally to
amend policy and statutory provisions. For example, the state is not
barred from drastically altering its exchange requirements. 73 Often the
incentives upon which the foreign nation depends are cast in general
terms which allow the state to abrogate them solely by administrative
action of the board with which he has been dealing informally. The
continued availability of these advantages is also subject to the
sovereign power of the state to reform controlling legislation for review
of national welfare or crisis. 74
C. The Programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
OPIC was created by the Congress for the purpose of mobilizing
the participation of private capital and skills in the economic and social
development of less developed friendly countries, thereby comple-
menting the development assistance of the United States Govern-
ment. 75 The programs offered by OPIC are grouped under two main
headings: (1) insurance of U.S. private investment insurance against
certain political risks in less developed countries and; (2) financing the
investigation and development of projects of U.S. investors in those
countries. 76 Specifically as to the insurance program OPIC is au-
thorized to insure against: (1) inconvertibility of local currencies; (2)
loss of investment due to expropriation, nationalization or confiscation
by a foreign government; (3) loss due to war, revolution or insurrec-
tion. 7 7
Focusing upon problems of inconvertibility, OPIC insurance pro-
tection of eligible American investors is designed to assure that both
earnings and capital can continue to be transfered into dollars, as
71 Pugh, supra note 6, at 305.
72 Id.
73 See generally F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY (1953).
74 C. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
699-700 n. 3 (1970).
75 Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, 22 U.S.C. § 2191 et seq. (1970) (amended 1974).
76 OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, INVESTMENT INSURANCE HANDBOOK
(1976).
77 Id. at 6.
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determined by the degree of transferability allowed under exchange
regulations and practices in force at the time the insurance was
acquired. Events which trigger OPIC liability under the insurance
policy include either active blockage by the exchange control au-
thorities denying access to foreign exchange on the basis of new
regulations, or passive blockage where the authorities fail to respond
to an application for foreign exchange within a specified time period. 78
Thus the program protects the rights of the American investor which
were secured from the host government at the time the investment was
insured. The investor may rely upon either the host country's general
exchange legislation in force at the time or upon a special agreement.
Should the host country deviate from these terms and the investor not
be able to transfer receipts into dollars as expected, then the investor
would have a valid claim under the insurance contract.
79
The OPIC insurance program is limited in geographic and substan-
tive scope. The insurance is not available for investments in every
developing country and it does not apply to alterations of a wide range
of investment terms which are subject to unilateral government action.
In addition, by an act of Congress passed in 1974, OPIC will not be able
to insure investments against inconvertability and other types of
political risks as of 1980.80 While OPIC provides a measure of protec-
tion, the insurance program is already limited and faces certain further
reduction. Whether or not similar political risk insurance will be
available from the private sector by 1980 is problematic.
D. Protection Afforded By Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
(FCN)
The FCN bilateral treaty series offers limited protection from the
imposition of significant exchange control restrictions.8 " The treaties
operate to provide such protection by obligating the parties to accord
national and most-favored-nation treatment as to payments, remit-
tances and transfers of funds between contracting states and by
imposing a prohibition against the use of "unnecessarily" or "arbitrat-
ily discriminatory" controls.8 2 While the treaties seem to provide for
complete exchange freedom by barring the imposition of exchange
restrictions, this obligation is rendered illusory by the existence of
"except clauses" which allow a state to adopt such restrictions as are
necessary to prevent its monetary reserves from falling to too low a
level.83
71 Pugh, supra note 6, at 339-41.
79 Id.
80 Pub. L. No. 93-390, 88 Stat. 763 (1974).
81 See generally Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42
MINN. L. REv. 805 (1958); Walker, The Post-War Commercial Treaty Program of the United
States, 73 POLITICAL SCI. Q. 57 (1958).
82 Pugh, supra note 6, at 323.
83 Id.
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In their usual form, FCN treaties contain no language limiting the
regulation of foreign capital by the receiving country.8 4 Protection
afforded the foreign investors is limited to the treaty articles which
prohibit the type of discriminatory exchange practices normally pre-
vented under the rules of customary international law. The treaties are
a "step toward stability and predictability for the foreign investor ....
These means may be of little use in case of major crises or revolutionary
changes, but they provide substantial legal protection in the majority
of routine cases of unfair treatment. s8 5 Thus it would appear that the
treaties do offer guarantees that go beyond the protection of customary
international law by applying restrictions on the exercise of state
sovereignty. However, as suggested by Pugh, the scope and flexibility
of the qualifying exceptions to the requirement of free exchange
"suggest quite compellingly that in a particular case the treaty obliga-
tions are likely to afford little real protection against losses resulting
from the imposition of exchange controls. '8 6
E. The IBRD Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States
The IBRD Convention was designed to supplement the numerous
investment treaties by providing for facilities to settle investment
disputes between a state and a private investor by conciliation or by
arbitration. It also sets out substantive rules governing arbitration and
conciliation falling within its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a tribunal
organized under the convention is, however, subject to the intent of
the parties. As stated by the preamble to the convention,
No contracting state shall by the mere fact of its ratification,
acceptance or approval of this convention and without its consent
be deemed to be under any obligation to submit any particular
dispute to conciliation or arbitration.
Therefore, while the convention has been signed by sixty-four states
and ratified by fifty-seven as of 1970, ratification alone does not create
obligations of adherence. 87
By the terms of the convention, disputes regarding agreements
between foreign nationals and a state are subject to arbitration if the
parties so consent. Once consent is given, the home state of the
individual is deprived of any possibility of diplomatic intervention or
subrogation. 88 While the convention provides for a reasonable means
84 Fatouros, Legal Securityfor International Investment, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT 706 (W. Friedmann & R. Pugh eds. 1959).
85 Id. at 709.
86 Pugh, supra note 6, at 324.
87 1. DELUPIS, FINANCE AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 125
(1973).
88 Id. at 126.
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of dispute settlement should the parties concur, the convention is
effective only as a means of enforcing a modification and restriction of
the foreign state's broad sovereign power if the investor succeeds in
establishing that such restraints are contained in the development
agreement.8 9 Without the establishment of specific terms as to rights of
transfer (and any other issues), the IBRD Convention will not inhibit
unilateral governmental reforms of investment legislation which
would injure the foreign investor.
F. Security Under Customary International Law
Customary international law accords protection of questionable
value to investors in a developing state. One cannot rely upon a well
defined body of law since there is no general agreement on the degree
of protection given private property and other rights by international
law. Nor is the investor guaranteed that the United States will assert
his claim before an international forum. Commitments made under
private law of the receiving state or upon the approval of administra-
tive authority place the investor in the most difficult position to
establish a violation of international law. To improve the foreign
national's legal status, transactions must be cast in the form of formal
development agreements binding both the alien and the state.
There is a wide divergence among the views of the capital-
exporting states, the communist bloc and the capital-importing coun-
tries of the developing world as to the extent of state responsibility for
injuries to aliens. There is at present no agreement on the controlling
substantive principles. No consensus exists as to what constitutes
unlawful expropriation. 90 Nor is there agreement as to the extent to
which a general change in local tax laws, exchange control laws or
import controls, which has the effect of reducing the profits or the
value of property, may be held to constitute a taking of property. 91 In
this regard the United Nations Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources which addresses the issues of nationalization,
expropriation and inherent rights to natural resources has been typi-
cally criticized as being too equivocal and abstract in the general
principles it enunciates to provide a very helpful contribution to the
development of international law. 92
The United States investor relying upon the protection of interna-
tional law must also evaluate the likelihood that the federal govern-
ment will assert his claim in the event of a dispute. As a general rule
the Department of State will not assert the right, as the representative
of a sovereign nation, to intervene in cases involving breach of contract
89 Id. at 127.
90 A. FATOUROS, supra note 5, at 245.
91 Pugh, supra note 6, at 316.
92 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 611 (1943).
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between a foreign state and a national of the United States in the
absence of a showing of a denial of justice. 93 In order to raise a claim
before an international forum the investor must thus establish that he
has been unduly discriminated against or that he has been denied the
means under local law through which reparations for injuries might be
obtained. 94
In any event, the investor must first establish that a claim actually
exists. In the common case of an investor committing capital in
accordance with the private law of the receiving state or under some
administrative authority, a mere alteration of the exchange control
laws governing such investments will not constitute a violation of
international law. 95
The principal objective of exchange control by developing coun-
tries is the protection of the balance-of-payments position by prevent-
ing the flight of capital and by limiting the effective demand for foreign
exchange. In addition to this protective function, exchange controls
serve also as key tools of economic policy, encouraging favored
investment and necessary capital reinvestment. 96 These are, of course,
valid public purposes sufficient to support national legislation drasti-
cally altering the terms of prior exchange control laws under which an
investor originally committed capital. The continued availability of
exchange terms provided by general legislation is also subject to
emergency controls of other statutes and the sovereign powers of the
state.97
Customary international law recognizes a state's right of control
over its currency as a necessary attribute of sovereignty. Derived from
this sovereign right is the power of the state to restrict the transfer of
currency in the public interest.98 Recognizing this power, the United
States International Claims Commission has held that "so long as the
exchange control measures are not discriminatory, no principle of
international law is violated." 99 In reviewing the status of international
law on this issue, the United States Department of State has reached a
similar conclusion, and would seem, therefore, to be unwilling to
espouse an aggrieved investor's cause absent a showing of discrimina-
tion. 100 Thus the only sanction against undue regulation is the likeli-
hood that foreign entrepreneurs will abstain from future investments
93 A. FATOUROS, supra note 5, at 244.
9 Pugh, supra note 6, at 319.
95 A. FATOUROS, supra note 5, at 49.
96 J. HENDERSON, supra note 10, at 95.
97 F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY 419 (2d ed. 1953).
98 Id.
99 Tabor Claim (No. 3), 20 I.L.R. 242, 243 (Int'l Claims Commission, United States
1953).
100 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INT'L LAw 68 (1941).
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- a counterproductive result for developing countries, but of no aid to
committed investors.
The legal position of an investor may, however, be improved by
dressing any guarantees secured from the foreign state in contractual
garb. 101 In this new guise any guarantees as to currency convertibility
given by the host nation could be given the protection of international
law. Commentators assert that states should be considered guilty of
internationally tortious acts whenever they violate their contracts with
aliens. 10 2 Recognizing the evolving nature of the law on this matter
and the difficulty of formulating a specific statement of applicable
rules, legal theorists have offered the following position as a proper
statement of international law:
[I]t seems reasonably clear that in order for a breach to constitute a
violation of international law, it must constitute an exercise of
governmental power that adversely affects the rights of the alien in
a pronounced and manifestly unfair way, taking into account all
relevant circumstances .... It has been suggested that general
concepts of law such as unjust enrichment, estoppel and abuse of
right may play a role in the development of principles to be applied
to varying cases of contractual breach.
Thus, it would appear that in certain, although possibly quite
limited, circumstances a violation by a foreign state of an assurance
it has made in an agreement... would give rise to a claim under
international law .... 103
Further support for this proposition may be found in the Twelfth
Harvard Draft. 10 4 These positions are consistent with a number of
101 Pugh supra note 6, at 321.
102 See, e.g., C. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 143-45 (1958); O'Connell,
Legal Issues in the Persian Oil Dispute 28 N.Z.L.J. 57, 58 (1952); see also Wehberg, Pacta
Sunt Servanda, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 775, 786 (1959).
103 Pugh, supra note 6, at 319,
104 With respect to the circumstances under which a government act will be held a
violation of international law, see Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to
the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545 (1961), with full text of the Twelfth
Harvard Draft at 548 et seq. TWELFTH HARVARD DRAFT, Article 12, paragraph (1):
1. The violation through an arbitrary action of the State of a contract or concession
to which the central government of that State and an alien are parties is wrongful. In
determining whether the action of the State is arbitrary, it is relevant to consider
whether the action constitutes:
(a) a clear and discriminatory departure from the proper law of the contract or
concession as that law existed at the time of the alleged violation;
(b) a clear and discriminatory departure from the law of the State which is a party
to the contract or concession as that law existed at the time of the making of the
contract or concession, if that law is the proper law of the contract or concession;
(c) an unreasonable departure from the principles recognized by the principal
legal systems of the world as applicable to governmental contracts or concessions of
the same nature or category; or
(d) a violation by the State of a treaty.
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authorities that apply the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda to an agree-
ment between a state and an alien.' 05
The development agreement makes it easier for all parties con-
cerned to understand exactly which actions will constitute a breach of
the working relationship. As a quasi-international contract the agree-
ment is not governed by municipal law alone, and therefore a breach of
the contractual terms may constitute a violation of an obligation under
international law. Thus, in our example, if an alteration of exchange
terms greatly affects the very basis of the agreement, it may constitute
a departure from the law of the contract and create grounds for legal
remedy.
In addition, the formality of the agreement yields a further
advantage for the foreign investor by virtue of its special legislative
force. This is simply that the host government, if it is true to its own
formal requirements, will have to take high-level legislative action if it
wants to alter the terms of the agreement. Thus the danger of arbitrary
administrative action at lower levels is somewhat reduced. 10 6
Conclusion
The American investor relies upon a variety of legal relationships
to secure the rights and interests arising from capital commitments in a
developing country. These legal devices are the product of efforts by
the capital-exporting and host countries to provide the stability and
reduce the risks necessary to stimulate desired foreign investment. The
level of foreign-direct investment is, in turn, a function of the success
of these efforts in creating a healthy investment climate within the
limitations of existing socio-economic, political, and legal conditions.
Focusing upon the legal factors, this comment has attempted to survey
both the developmental investment process and the status of the
foreign investor while suggesting the advantages - for both parties -
of the development agreement.
The development plans, laws and regulations of the less de-
veloped nations make clear their policies and attitudes toward foreign
investment. These official pronouncements are important to the
American investor, for they specifically control the scope of investment
opportunities by enumerating the types of investments open to foreign
participation, the conditions for entry, and the regulations affecting
the remission of profits and repatriation of capital, to mention only a
few factors. The continuing availability of these investments is subject
105 Brandon, Legal Aspects of Private Foreign Investments, 18 FED. B.J. 298, 337-40
(1958); Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 597 (1961); Kissam &
Leach, Sovereign Expropriation of Property and Abrogation of Concession Contracts, 28
FORDHAM L. REV. 177, 194-214 (1959); Ray, Law Governing Contracts Between States and
Foreign Nationals, 2 INST. ON PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD 5 (1960); Schweibel, Interna-
tional Protection of Contractual Arrangements, 53 PROC. AM. SOCY INT'L L. 266 (1959).
106 Fatouros, supra note 84, at 724-25.
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to the exercise of the sovereign powers of the state and thus represents
an element of risk to the investor. Further problems exist with respect
to the general nature of such terms, which by necessity are used to
govern a wide range of direct foreign investments.
The degree of state responsibility under international law for
injuries to alien investors as a result of unilateral alterations of
investment terms is an unsettled issue. Giving foreign investments the
protection of international law does not by itself settle the difficulty
because international law has not yet succeeded in developing the
necessary rules.
Since disputes may arise out of the interpretation and application
of the host state's investment laws and policies, the parties are advised
to enter into a development agreement specifying the investment
terms. Many investments are initiated without an explicit statement of
essential terms because of a desire on the part of the investor not to
antagonize the host country during the delicate negotiations. Yet it is
clearly in the interest of the private investor to address these issues, as
they are essential to the protection of his interests against the danger of
creeping expropriation. The development agreement provides a format
which allows the investor to do just this while strengthening his legal
position. At the same time it allows the host country to maintain
maximum flexibility in meeting its economic development goals while
creating an atmosphere of investment stability.
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